Here are some things to consider when trying to understand what’s going on between Putin’s Russia and Ukraine, drawn from my own accumulated knowledge of the situation.
- Why Russia seized Crimea. Russia is a landlocked country with access to the world’s oceans only through the Arctic, its Far East port of Vladivostock, and the Mediterranean via the Black Sea. Crimea, and its port facilities, from a military standpoint, are vital for keeping the sea routes through the Black Sea to the Mediterranean open. Historically, Crimea has been part of the Russian empire in the past; and, in addition, over two-thirds of Crimea’s inhabitants are ethnic Russians, and only about one-eight are ethnic Ukrainians.
- Eastern Ukraine’s inhabitants are predominantly Russian. While politicians often treat borders as sacrosanct (or pretend they are), history tends to produce arbitrary borders. In Ukraine, the farther east you go, the more Russian the country is. Ethnically, Ukraine’s borderlands with Russia are roughly 90% Russian, while its western regions bordering Eastern Europe are roughly 90% Ukrainian. A large number of eastern Ukraine’s people want to be part of Russia, not Ukraine.
- There’s no love lost between Ukrainians and Russians. During the Soviet era, especially under Stalin, Ukrainians suffered terribly under Russian government. Ukrainians were victims of Russian terror policies, and millions of Ukrainians died in the famines caused by Russian agricultural management, collectivization, and Stalin’s deliberate starvation policies. Also, Ukrainians were drafted into the Soviet army and used as cannon fodder during World War 2. Ukrainians have a genuine hatred of Russians. This complicates the demographics factor, because Ukrainians don’t want to be governed by Russians, and ethnic Russians living in Ukraine understandably don’t want to be governed by an ethnic group that despises their ethnic group, which puts pressure on Russian authorities to annex the predominantly ethnic Russia parts of Ukraine and integrate those Russians into Russia.
- Moscow’s paranoia toward Europe. While this may be difficult for Americans to appreciate, Russia has repeatedly been invaded from the direction of Europe, at terrible costs to its people, and to this day Moscow retains an active paranoia about the vulnerability of its European borders. Putin’s key demand is that Ukraine must not join NATO, a concession the U.S. and its European allies are unwilling to make. For Russia, this would be like having a Russian or Chinese army deployed along America’s border with Canada. After World War 2, Russia occupied Eastern Europe to maintain a “buffer zone” between its homeland and the Western European countries that invaded Russia in the past (France, Germany). Putin doesn’t necessarily want to retake possession of Ukraine in entirety, and was satisfied with the status quo when Ukraine was ruled by a Moscow-friendly dictator, but is alarmed by the current Ukraine government’s affinity for, and ties to, the West. Americans and Westerners should not discount or underestimate the historic paranoia embedded in Russian psyche. However unrealistic the notion of a NATO attack on Russia might be, Putin’s and his generals’ strategic thinking is governed by a strong urge to maintain Ukraine as a buffer between the Russian homeland and the NATO countries.
- Putin wants to rebuild the Russian empire. Driven by national pride, and a sense of fallen glory, Putin wants to bring as much of the former Soviet empire back under Russian control as he can. He’s doing this by nibbling away at, and sometimes invading, former Soviet territories such as Georgia and Chechnya. The same desire to dissipate Russia’s fallen pride and image of weakness is driving Russia’s re-militarization, rebuilding of its military forces (which fell into decrepitude after the Soviet Union’s collapse), and renewed saber rattling.
- Domestic political considerations. Putin wants to look like a strong, tough, leader capable of forcefully asserting Russia’s national interests, and most Russians support what he’s doing. His belligerency plays into the Russian cultural psyche. Don’t forget that Russia is the land of the Cossacks, and while they are a distinct ethnic group, something of a Cossack mentality has been assimilated into the Russian national identity.
- Economic considerations. The disputed Ukrainian Donbas region bordering Russia was one of the Soviet Union’s most important industrial centers, is ethnically Russian, and Moscow wants to reclaim it for its own economy.
- Strategic and military calculations. Putin figures, correctly, that Biden and his NATO compatriots won’t risk World War 3 to save Ukraine. Formerly a part of the Soviet Union, that country isn’t worth trading European and American cities for. If Russia invades Ukraine with overwhelming conventional forces, America and its allies won’t resort to nuclear options to stop them, as they might if Russia invaded Western Europe. Fighting a conventional war against Russian forces in a country next door to Russia isn’t feasible, given the long lines of communication. The most the West will do is supply Ukraine with weapons, intelligence and communications, and other forms of support short of direct military intervention. Putin has factored this support into his calculations and military planning as something to be dealt with on a tactical level.
- Sanctions. The U.S., working with its NATO allies, has made clear the West will punish Russia with economic sanctions if it invades Ukraine. These sanctions will hurt Russia’s economy, but won’t deter Putin. To him, solving his “Ukraine problem,” which he defines in terms of having a hostile alliance on his vulnerable western border, is worth whatever non-military costs the West can impose on him and his country.
While Putin has negotiated with the West over Ukraine, the negotiations probably are only for show — so he can say he tried to settle the “problem” peacefully. Putin presented the West with multiple demands he knew they either would not accept, or if they accepted them, would be humiliating and make NATO look weak and ineffectual. (Putin has long wanted to break up NATO, which is one of the reasons he supported Trump, who was hostile toward the NATO alliance.) These negotiations are destined to fail, and Moscow deliberately set them up to fail.
That being the case, Biden is almost certainly correct in predicting that Russia will invade eastern Ukraine. The only thing in doubt is how far Russian forces will penetrate, and how much of Ukraine they will seize. This might not be the entire country, as the farther west they go, the more Ukrainian the population becomes, and the more likely they are to run up against fierce Ukrainian guerilla resistance. Ethnic Ukrainians hate Russians, and they will keep fighting even if their country is conquered and occupied by Russian armies — there would be no end to the bloodletting and Russian casualties. For Moscow, it would be the prospect of another Afghanistan. For that reason, Moscow’s objectives probably are limited, and if Putin greenlights an invasion, the Russian forces most likely will go only so far and no further.
For those reasons, a Russian invasion of Ukraine most likely would simply move the Russia-Ukraine border farther east, as long as what remains of Ukraine isn’t admitted to NATO. But there’s a chance that Putin, denied a guarantee from the West that it won’t be, might occupy the entire country to enforce his demand that Ukraine “never, ever” be allowed to join NATO.